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Abstract  
 
Purpose: This article presents a case study examining how a notion of „reasonable 
safety‟ provision has come to be constructed by municipal cemetery managers in 
relation to gravestones and other memorial structures over the last decade in 
England.  
 
Design/methodology/approach The article is based upon a literature review of 
policy and law and the results of qualitative face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with a small sample of English municipal cemetery managers.  
 
Findings: The issue of memorial safety illustrates the tensions that can arise 
between safety and conflicting priorities, in this case sensitivity to the bereaved. The 
study shows that the simple promulgation of guidance will not automatically lead to it 
being accepted by all as "good practice". The interviews show how organisations 
and individual managers have sought to make sense of, and render workable, the 
memorial safety issue by drawing upon, and at times ignoring or adapting, available 
guidance.  
Research limitations/implications: The interview study was based upon a small 
non-random sample, accessed via a single phase of enquiry in Spring 2008. The 
influence of fear of liability may manifest differently in other cemetery managers 
and/or change over time. Given the novel, and powerful „resisting–forces‟ in the case 
of cemeteries direct comparison with the risk perception of managers in other parts 
of the built environment may be difficult.  
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Originality/value: Given the lack of existing research in the field of liability 
perception by landowners, this article may assist analysis of the generic processes 
by which safety guidance is negotiated, and reconciled with competing drivers in 
management of the built environment. 
 
1. Introduction 
How do place managers perceive and respond to occupiers' liability and safety laws?  
This article explores this question through a case study: the management of 
memorial3 safety within English municipal cemeteries.  
Gravestones, statues and other memorial structures are often modest in scale, but 
the circumstances of their erection, abandonment and subsequent use raise 
interesting questions about how „reasonable safety‟ is determined for such structures 
and the ways in which a balance comes to be struck between safety and other 
priorities.  
The issue of memorial safety within English municipal cemeteries has seen heighten 
press interest in recent years (for example BBC 2002; BBC 2003; Morpeth Herald 
2005; Church Times 2006; Nurden 2006; Groves 2008). It was originally brought to 
the media‟s attention following the fatal crushing of a six year old child by an 
unstable gravestone in a Harrogate cemetery in 2000. Following the accident (and 
the ensuing compensation claim and enforcement action), many local authorities 
embarked upon programmes of „topple testing‟, and consequent removal, staking or 
laying flat of 'unsafe' gravestones, a project claimed to have cost £15 Million 
nationwide (Groves 2008). Yet such steps were swiftly met with public complaint and 
adverse press comment. It appeared that an attempt to respond to a perceived 
public safety risk had backfired, and needed re-thinking.  
Commentators such as Adams 1995: 210; Ball 1995: 4; Ball 2002: Section 7.2; 
Haythornthwaite (quoted in RRAC 2008) and RRAC 2009 argue that in 
contemporary society the interpretation and application of public safety law is 
frequently subject to a „ratchet effect‟ whereby legal requirements are interpreted 
ever more cautiously and restrictively. The ratchet effect is, in particular, associated 
with calls “that more should be done” in the aftermath of an accident that attracts 
public attention4. These commentators see this effect as spurred by the rise of „risk 
entrepreneurs‟ (advisers, who, they claim, have a vested interest in preaching 
                                                          
3
 In this article the expression ‘memorial’ comprises gravestones, statues, crosses, railings and other smaller 
elements related to a grave or tomb such as curbs, plinths, plaques, markers and vases – to the extent that 
they might have the ability to cause injury. 
4
 When related to a legislation made in the aftermath of, and in reaction to, a high profile incident this is 
sometimes (coincidentally) referred to as ‘tombstone regulation’, see for example Lodge and Hood’s (2002) 
comparative analysis of dangerous dogs legislation 
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caution and risk avoidance). They believe that by such racheting, and the preaching 
of such „experts‟, place managers‟ judgments about adequate safety provision are 
rendered ever more cautious, with corresponding negative effects on recreational 
access and aesthetic enjoyment of the natural and the built environment. They then 
conclude that these effects, when combined with fear of media criticism in the event 
of an accident, and a perception that members of the public are nowadays more 
likely to claim compensation in the event of an accident (HSE 2007a), lead to greater 
caution in place management and, on occasion, withdrawal of access to public 
space altogether. 
By this view, if left unchecked matters of safety and liability avoidance can come to 
dominate place management, for as Landry (2005) notes, drawing upon the social 
theorists who observed and interpreted the rise of a "Risk Society" during the 1990s 
(e.g. Beck 1992; Furedi 1997): 
"The evaluation of everything from a perspective of risk is a defining 
characteristic of contemporary society. Risk is the managerial paradigm and 
default mechanism that has embedded itself into how companies, community 
organisations and the public sector operate. Risk is a prism through which any 
activity is judged...It narrows our world into a defensive shell." (Landry 2005: 
3) 
For Adams, writing in relation to the proliferation of protective street furniture, this 
process actually often plays itself out at a subtle, unintentional level. There is 
normally no conspiracy, no pre-mediation by such entrepreneurs or managers to 
bring about this effect. But instead: 
"[the]signs, signals, barriers and road markings are not the work of any single 
planner; they are the cumulative result of numbers of uncoordinated 
interventions...[and] the primary justification for almost all the clutter will be 
safety..." (Adams 2005: 39) 
Whilst many commentators (e.g. Blair 2005; BRC 2006; Letts 2009) have stepped 
forward to echo the views described above (often within the context of debates about 
the alleged adverse effects of „compensation culture‟ and „over-regulation‟) there has 
been little research in the United Kingdom to map the effects of safety and liability 
fears within actual place management scenarios. Much is left to bold assertion. As 
Bennett and Crowe (2008: 78) argue, the debate would be greatly served by 
research to establish whether any evidence can actually be found of such alleged 
effects. 
Accordingly, the aim of this article is to evaluate the impact and interpretation of 
liability risk fears solely within one place management scenario – that of the 
management of memorial safety within municipal cemeteries in England.  
Through this analysis the operation of the ratchet effect, and of risk entrepreneurs, 
will be shown to be a complex, contested – and uncertain - process. Indeed, this is 
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the case both at the level of „policy‟ framing and at the level of „on the ground‟ 
interpretation of what „reasonable safety‟ means to individual managers. This case 
study will show the extent to which these effects have been met by „resisting-forces‟ 
(CABE Space 2007a: 38). It also will show how promulgation of guidance by national 
stakeholders cannot be guaranteed, of itself, to automatically bring about a change 
in liability perception or site management behaviour. 
The case study examined here is approached from a constructionist perspective 
(Berger and Luckmann 1971; Velody and Williams 1998). It specifically seeks to 
show how the „reality‟ of liability under civil and criminal laws for premises safety is 
„constructed‟ by the interaction of stakeholders, and the personal interpretations of 
place managers. This approach derives from a blend of traditional descriptive policy 
analysis and interpretive social theory. As an approach, it has its roots in socio-legal 
studies of the operation of 'law-in-practice', such as Hutter (1988) and Ewick & Sibey 
(1998).  
Whilst this case study is largely descriptive (because the debate currently needs 
more empirical examples, rather than more theorising) the article‟s approach is 
informed by theoretical perspectives that argue that risk perception is an inherently 
cultural process (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Slovic 
1992; Douglas 1992; Tulloch 2008), and that it is necessary to study why and how a 
particular risk issue does or doesn‟t take hold (the so-called „social amplification of 
risk‟ model: Pidgeon et al 2006). The research approach used for this study also 
draws upon „reader/reception' perspectives  from cultural / communication studies 
and literary theory – perspectives which suggest that what needs to be studied is 
how people react to texts, and what meaning they make of them, rather than solely 
to focus upon what the author intended to convey or impose by his text. In particular 
the aim is to observe and analyse how „interpretive communities‟ (Fish 1980) come 
to shape the way in which „the law‟ is collectively interpreted and applied within a 
particular community: in this case study, municipal cemetery managers, the 
organisations within which they work, and the professional associations to which 
they belong.  
The focus of this case study is therefore upon illustrating how a practical, and largely 
„lay‟, interpretation of „reasonable safety' evolved over the last 10 years due to the 
interplay of concern for public safety and respect for the bereaved. In short, how in 
each manager‟s mind a „common-sense‟ understanding of what the level of risk is, 
and what he must do in response to it, was constructed as a result of the local and 
professional culture in which the manager was situated5.  
This perspective does not, however, seek to argue that all possible interpretations of 
what the law requires have equal validity. Accordingly, an interpretation of how risk 
                                                          
5
 This ‘social constructionist’ analysis of meaning formation is common in studies of risk perception.  For 
example it is found in the work of Backett-Milburn, and Harden (2004) on the construction and negotiation of 
risk and risk management notions at the level of the family unit. 
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of liability is perceived needs to be situated within at least a brief outline of what the 
applicable law appears to be trying to achieve. 
Place managers' liabilities in England regarding safety provision for lawful visitors 
and trespassers are set by the Occupiers' Liability Acts 1957 & 1984 and the Health 
& Safety at Work Act 1974: a mix of criminal and civil legislation augmented by case 
law, regulations and guidance. In deciding their place management strategies, it is 
this matrix of law and policy that cemetery managers are attempting to interpret and 
apply to their specific sites. 
Both occupiers' liability law and the health & safety law require an employer / place 
occupier to do that which is reasonable in relation to the provision of safety. Whilst 
the Health & Safety Executive ("HSE" - the applicable occupational health and safety 
regulator), professional associations and other groupings provide interpretations of 
what they regard as "reasonable" provision in defined circumstances, the ultimate 
choice is left to the duty holder (with the risk that they will be judged with the benefit 
of hindsight if something goes wrong). 
It is this broad opportunity for subjective judgment about what the law requires that 
gives rise to the broad range of interpretations that the case study will show. 
2. Cemeteries and their management 
 
To understand the pressures shaping management of municipal cemeteries, and 
therefore the context within which judgments about „reasonable safety‟ are made, it 
is necessary to present a concise historical summary of the origins of cemeteries 
and the manner in which they came to be managed. 
 
In England cemeteries are municipal (or privately owned) graveyards. They are 
predominantly an innovation of the Nineteenth Century, built from the early part of 
the 1800s in a response to the severe lack of burial capacity in the rapidly growing 
urban centres following the Industrial Revolution. Whilst they may have consecrated 
areas they are not primarily religious in their provision and management and can be 
contrasted with the traditional burial areas of churchyards in this respect. They also 
differ in size - municipal cemeteries were constructed on an "industrial" scale, 
developments such as Brookwood Necropolis (opened 1854 near Woking, Surrey), 
were literally envisaged as "cities of the dead", with Brookwood even featuring its 
own rail connection to London's Waterloo station (Arnold 2006: 166). 
Much has been written of the Victorian "cult of the dead", the rich cultural 
prominence of mourning in that era (e.g. Curl 2000). Cemeteries are the built 
environment legacy to that time and civic focus.  As noted in a submission to a 
Parliamentary inquiry on cemeteries in 2001, cemeteries are a showcase of Victorian 
landscape design, architecture and sculpture (ETRA 2001: para 22). The design and 
management of cemeteries was the subject of considerable thought and publication, 
with John Claudius Loudon's 1843 manual On the Laying Out, Planting and 
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Management of Cemeteries (Loudon 1843) having formative impact upon the 
emerging large urban cemeteries. It promoted a rationalist cemetery design style, 
one focussed upon ordered (often grid-layout) arrangement and moral and 
educational instructional from the built form presented there. These cemeteries were 
designed for both the living and the dead.  
In the Twentieth century cemetery design style moved more towards a lawned 
"memorial gardens" approach, ordered rows of gravestone memorials but without 
curbs or railings. This was a move towards functionalism in maintenance, and 
perhaps a sign of the decline in the symbolic importance of cemeteries as a place for 
the living, but it also reflected the memorial style developed by the Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission following the carnage of the Great War (Brooks 1989: 76). 
In the opinion of the Parliamentary committee that examined the parlous state of 
cemeteries in 2001: 
"The mid Victorian crisis (urban burial needs) provided a short term solution, 
but left Britain with a disastrous long-term legacy." (ETRA 2001: para 2) 
In the committee's view the Victorian focus upon perpetual (or at least as long as 
living memory) memorialisation of the dead, and the long term grant of exclusive 
rights to burial and restrictions on exhumation, which arose out of that, created an 
unsustainable burial culture. In particular a „spiral of decline‟ (ETRA 2001: para 4) 
sets in when burials cease, and revenue correspondingly starts to fall. The size of 
Victorian cemeteries, their elaborate monumental structures and the upkeep of 
extensive pathways and perimeter fencing render these expensive legacy land 
assets to manage, there being little scope for redevelopment or supplemental 
revenue generating streams. 
In consequence, memorial structures remain in the cemetery unless and until 
removed by the local authority.  
Local authorities, in their capacity as "burial authorities", have express powers and 
responsibilities in relation to the use and management of their cemeteries. These are 
now set out in the Local Authorities' Cemeteries Order 1977 ("the Order").  The 
Order addresses both the management of the fabric of the cemetery and public 
access to, and use of, the cemeteries.  
 
The Order obliges local authorities to keep their cemeteries in "good order and 
repair"(Article 4). However the conferred powers are qualified, there is no general 
right for a local authority to remove or otherwise undertake works to a memorial, as 
such structures are technically owned by the relatives of the deceased. The qualified 
power under Article 16 of the Order to carry out works only arises for memorials 
which are "illegible or dilapidated by reasons of long neglect" (and even for these the 
deceased‟s relatives must be given three months notice of intended action). 
 
The Order also provides the main reference point for cemetery managers in terms of 
their regulation of public use of their cemeteries. Article 18(1) of the Order prohibits 
wilful disturbance, nuisance, ball games or wilful interference with any memorial. 
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However the maximum penalty that can be imposed following any successful 
prosecution is only £100 (Article 19). 
Yet the restricted nature of memorial repairing powers and the limited scope of 
powers for dealing with anti-social behaviour within the cemetery, of themselves, 
provide no release for the cemetery manager from responsibility to provide for safety 
within the cemetery. Under the Occupiers' Liability Acts a local authority owes a duty 
of care to visitors, and also to trespassers, to provide „reasonable‟ safety within the 
cemetery – and this includes some extent of protection against dangers which such 
persons might cause to themselves, or others by inappropriate use of the cemetery 
and its structures. 
This is significant, because whilst the cultural focus upon death and cemeteries has 
faded, cemeteries remain visited places. Indeed, even despite the Twentieth century 
shift away from burial towards cremation, graveyards remain a significant destination 
for the dead and their bereaved relatives. A 2000 survey by English Heritage survey 
recorded 2,047 churchyards and cemeteries in England, with 83% still receiving 
burials (English Heritage 2007)6. 
 
An ethnographic study of major London cemeteries by Francis et al (2005), which 
was specifically targeted at "studying the living in cemeteries", found higher than 
expected usage of cemeteries by the bereaved, particularly in the early years 
following burial. In their study Francis et al looked at the ritual behaviours of those 
visiting graves and noted the strong sense of (emotional) ownership over graves. 
Their study found evidence of long term visitation, and that such visitors were 
observant and cherishing of the cemetery as a whole.   
Indeed, as Francis et al (2005: 106) note, public expectations of cemetery 
management are not principally about grounds maintenance, they are about creating 
and maintaining surroundings of mourning. Cemetery users are particularly 
connected to "their cemetery", and their graves7. Given this, it is perhaps not 
surprising that strong feelings can quickly emerge when local authorities embark 
upon schemes to remove memorials, stake them or lay them flat.  
3. Memorial safety: reaction and counter reaction  
                                                          
6
 Whilst this study is concerned with the tension between safety and the interests of the bereaved it I should 
be acknowledged that cemeteries, in particular the elegant Victorian ones, like Highgate, Brompton and Kensal 
Green in London also attract visitors motivated by aesthetic appreciation (Meller 1994). Urban cemeteries are 
increasingly praised by heritage and conservation groups as valuable ‘green spaces’ within now crowded cities 
(CABE Space 2007b). In recent decades this heritage value has resulted in many cemeteries (and/or memorials 
within them) receiving protected status either as listed gardens, listed buildings or conservation areas (English 
Heritage 2007). 
7
 They also are well organised, with many cemeteries having groups of volunteers who take it upon themselves 
to be the defenders of 'their' cemetery, for example in Stoke-on-Trent Grave’s Group (SOTGG 2009). These 
groups can affiliate to the National Federation of Cemetery Friends (NFCF 2009).  
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The tension between bereavement and safety management can now be examined 
through a policy history of memorial safety management over the last decade and by 
analysing interviews with municipal cemetery managers. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
 
The policy analysis presented here is based upon a review of stakeholder websites, 
local and central government reports, law reports and media coverage. 
  
The cemetery manager interviews were carried out in Spring 2008. Our interviews 
were semi-structured face to face meetings with cemetery managers at their place of 
work. Five local authorities managing municipal cemeteries were selected and 
targeted questions asked of a cemetery manager from each authority. For 
convenience the interview sample was located in the same region of England, 
representing urban or fringe urban local authorities.  
 
In order to respect their confidentiality, this article intentionally excludes any 
information that would identify our interviewees. Their voices largely spoke 
consistently, with little evidence of deviation between the different authorities. There 
was however differing emphasis in each interviewees' replies, and one respondent in 
particular appeared more pessimistic and fearful of liability than the others, and that 
appeared reflected in that council's particularly zealous approach to memorial safety. 
 
3.2 Memorial safety: a policy history 
A policy history must account for how risk of injury from unstable memorials came to 
emerge as a point of specific concern, and how policy and guidance then emerged to 
shape (and later „correct‟) appropriate response to that initial concern following 
media and public complaints. 
Two interviewees made passing reference to fatal tombstone accidents in Preston in 
1992 and Liverpool in 1995, but it is the death of a six year old child, Reuben Powell, 
in Grove Road Cemetery, Harrogate in July 2000 that appears for most to have been 
the "trigger" of current concern about the risk posed by memorials.  
Following the Harrogate incident, and the ensuing compensation claim, the Health & 
Safety Executive issued a guidance circular to local authority enforcement officers, 
drawing their attention to memorial safety as a risk issue that needed greater 
attention paid to it. This circular, LAC 23/18: HELA Local Authority Circular 23/18: 
Management of Unstable Memorials (HSE 2001) is credited by most of the 
interviewees, as the spur for the ensuing cemetery survey programmes, and mass 
precautionary action (laying down or staking gravestones). Service of an 
Improvement Notice upon Harrogate Borough Council in the aftermath of Reuben 
Powell's death, requiring it to accelerate its memorial testing programme, was further 
cause for anxiety and severe reaction amongst local authorities (LGO 2006:15).  
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It appears that a number of local authorities embarked upon severe risk reduction 
strategies in the light of Harrogate's fate, and that that fear of HSE enforcement 
remained at the forefront still of some cemetery managers interviewed for this study 
in Spring 2008, as one respondent noted: 
"All authorities have had letters from the HSE…telling us to look at gravestone 
safety. I mean look at what Harrogate got…that speaks volumes." 
The evidence of widespread laying down programmes comes from press reports, 
stakeholder websites and subsequent inquiries reviewed by the Local Government 
Ombudsman in 2006, who concluded:  
"Spurred on by concerns of public safety, many local authorities saw laying 
down as the immediate solution to the risk posed by unstable memorials. This 
work was often done without any consideration of degrees of risk or the effect 
on the public when scores or even hundreds of memorials were laid flat. The 
hurt was often compounded by failures of communication before and during 
the testing process." (LGO 2006:13). 
Memorials that were at risk of toppling were cordoned, laid flat, staked or internally 
doweled. Yet the zealous (i.e. particularly risk adverse) cemetery authorities soon 
encountered a wave of local protest, and consequent unwanted media attention, for 
example the following headline from the Sun, a popular English newspaper, in 
September 2004 (LGO 2006): 
"Desecrated. 372 tombstones felled...but not by louts...this time it's council 
morons." 
Adverse response to the great laying down was swift, with the 2001 Parliamentary 
committee's plea that: 
"…the Health & Safety Executive could act with greater sensitivity towards the 
historical and cultural significance of…memorials" (ETRA 2001: 
recommendation (kk))  
And that: 
 
 "Cemeteries with decrepit memorials, rows of gravestones laid flat, and areas 
cordoned off with red and white tape are not, in our view, fit places for the 
service of the bereaved." (ETRA 2001: para 108) 
 
However, the main driver for the repositioning of the issue was complaints raised by 
members of the pubic (usually relatives of the deceased interred in the affected 
graves) and the local media. For example, following a mass laying down of 
gravestones in Stoke on Trent, public outcry led to an independent inquiry and 
recommendation of compensation in 2003 (LGO 2006: 17; SOTGG 2009).  In other 
areas aggrieved relatives sought action either through the civil courts, as a claim for 
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compensation for the costs of re-erecting their memorials, or sought rulings from the 
Local Government Ombudsman alleging maladministration on the part of their local 
authority in its approach to memorial safety (LGO 2007). 
Claims for compensation via the courts tended not to succeed, for example a claim 
heard before Staines County Court (judgment 19 February 2004) (ICCM 2004) saw a 
District Judge uphold as valid the pressure test applied to the gravestone in 
question, basing his decision upon the belief that the Council had a legal obligation 
to take some action on memorial safety, and noting that the Council's policy was in 
accordance with the Institute of Cemetery & Crematorium Management‟s (ICCM) 
guidance on memorial safety.  
Claims of maladministration proved to be a more successful avenue of complaint. 
The Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) exercises a quasi-judicial public law 
review function in relation to complaints about local authorities' exercise of their 
powers and functions. It has power to issue censure and/or compensation awards 
against local authorities. The Ombudsman considered there to be sufficient public 
interest (and need for the introduction of clarity) for him to issue a Special Report: 
Memorial Safety in Local Authority Cemeteries (LGO 2006), the report opened with 
the declaration that: 
"We have found maladministration in the failure to ensure adequate 
publicity/notification before carrying out stability testing or laying down 
individual monuments which failed the test; not having in place a proper 
system for risk assessment and subsequent prioritisation of work; lack of 
proper training for those carrying out testing and the failure to seek advice 
from a suitably qualified person." (LGO 2006:3) 
Local authorities were criticised for over zealous laying down, failure to use properly 
trained staff and lack of prior consultation (or at least notification of grave and 
memorial owners). 
The Health & Safety Executive was quick to distance itself from the laying down.  
LAC 23/18 was withdrawn, and the HSE adopted the stance that it had issued no 
guidance on the matter - other than pointing out that cemetery owners should have 
regard to their own industry best practice on the issue. 
The Health & Safety Commission's Chairman, Bill Callaghan wrote to local 
authorities in 2004 (LGO 2006: 34) to remind them that that guidance required 
gravestones to be laid down only in the most serious of circumstances and to extol 
the virtues of good communication with the public. Mr Callaghan reiterated this 
message in 2006 (Callaghan 2006), in response to an article entitled "Relatives 
furious at state-sponsored grave desecration" (Nurden 2006). The article claimed 
that: 
"[Local authorities] say that their actions are merely following HSE guidelines"  
and quoted a bereaved relative's perception that: 
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"countless other gravestones have been laid over. The real reason for all this 
madness is the insurance industry and the modern scourge of risk 
assessment". 
Noting the sensitivity of the matter, and the challenge faced by local authorities in 
balancing memorial safety and the interests of the bereaved, Mr Callaghan 
commented that most local authorities were managing this challenge well, and that: 
"…only in a small number of cases is repair work being carried out in an 
indiscriminate and over zealous manner." (Callaghan 2006) 
Mr Callaghan's 2006 letter was followed in March 2007 by a joint letter (HSE 2007b) 
signed by the Chairman of the Local Government Association, Mr Callaghan and 
three Government ministers. The letter was sent to the Chief Executive of each local 
authority and to all cemetery managers. 
That letter again stated that most local authorities were responding proportionately to 
the issue of memorial safety, but added that: 
"it would seem that it is still the case that a few authorities have acted 
precipitously. Flattening a memorial may cause great offence and upset and 
should only be done where really necessary for public safety. Even warning 
signs and temporary supports, if garish or insensitively installed, can have a 
detrimental effect and appear to disregard the feelings of bereaved people 
and the wider community." 
The letter reiterated that the memorial safety risk should be seen in context - and the 
issue handled with the "utmost sensitivity". 
The changing mood as the decade progressed was also revealed in the decisions of 
Consistory Courts upon application for the grant of approval (a "faculty") for testing 
and/or repair works to memorials in consecrated parts of cemeteries. A decision in 
2003 (Re Keynsham Cemetery8) had seen the judge decide that minor works to 
maintain safety of monuments did not require a faculty. However in a decision in 
2006 (Re Welford Road Cemetery, Leicester)9 the Consistory Court adopted a more 
cautious (and critical) approach - stating that the policy climate had changed and that 
consent for laying flat would only be forthcoming in exceptional circumstance, and 
then only where evidence of attempts to notify the memorial owners could be shown.  
3.3 The emergence of guidance  
Mr Callaghan‟s 2006 letter (Callaghan 2006) deferred to „industry practice‟: 
"there are no HSE guidelines, though there is guidance produced by the 
various organisations representing cemeteries" (Callaghan 2006) 
                                                          
8
 (2003) 1 WLR 66 
9
 (2006) Fam 62 
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In doing so it left the door open for a proliferation of rival standards and viewpoints. A 
study of the competing guidance that emerged over the last decade on the memorial 
safety issue reveals the array of professional, governmental and voluntary bodies 
who have sought to have a voice in this process. By 2008 a cemetery manager was 
faced with: 
 A Code of Working Practice issued by the National Association of Memorial 
Masons (NAMM) (revised 2003) as its design and installation standards for 
new memorials. 
 A British Standard (BS8415 Monuments within burial grounds and memorial 
sites) which was first issued for consultation 2001 and published in 2005. 
 The Association of Burial Authorities' (ABA) "Guide to the management of 
safety in burial grounds", published in 2001 in collaboration with the main local 
authority insurer, Zurich Municipal. 
 The Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management's guidance 
Management of Memorials (last revised April 2007). 
This guidance was additional to the „official‟ interpretations (attempted) steerage 
contained within the HSE, Ministerial and Ombudsman interventions described 
above. 
The rival guidance did not fit together neatly. Indeed the ICCM's response to the 
Ombudsman's 2006 Special Report (LGO 2006) argued that the Ombudsman's 
overwhelming desire to signal that laying down should not be necessary on any large 
scale (LGO 2006:3) was a fetter upon objective, site level, risk assessment (ICCM 
2006). ICCM asserted the view that given the requirements of safety and occupiers' 
liability law sensitivity to the bereaved and provision of memorial safety cannot be 
treated as equal. ICCM concluded by rejecting the Ombudsman's special report as 
not having achieved the goal of a single definitive set of guidance. 
A micro level analysis of the differences between the various guidance documents is 
beyond the scope of this article - however one technical issue will be looked at briefly 
to illustrate the tensions within the guidance setting process. 
Public complaint and press comment about memorial testing often focussed on the 
role of the „topple tester‟. A topple tester is, however, merely a hand held tool used to 
measure the stability of a gravestone by pressing it against that gravestone. The key 
issue was actually what test pressure, successfully resisted by the tested memorial, 
should be regarded as an indicator of a „safe‟ (i.e. stable) gravestone. The greater 
the force that a memorial is required to withstand to prove that it is „safe‟, the more 
likely it is that it will be found to fail the test. A lesser level of force would, conversely 
mean that more gravestones would be found to be „safe‟ (i.e. not showing signs of 
movement when the test‟s set level of force was applied to it). 
LGO 2006 noted that, for testing the stability of existing monuments, a force 
equivalent to 35kg had been approved by NAMM, ICCM and ABA/Zurich Mutual in 
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their respective guidance. However, despite this LGO 2006 felt it necessary (for their 
desired purpose of resolving the memorial safety issue once and for all) to set out a 
detailed review (Appendix 2 of LGO 2006) examining the rationale of the various test 
force standards. In the process of doing so they introduced into the debate 
submissions made in two separate Ombudsman inquiries into specific incidents of 
laying–down. Through this, rival bases for apparently advocating 30kg and 25kg 
force standards became known to the cemetery management community, even 
though LGO 2006 ultimately decided to endorse the 35kg standard (which was itself 
also derived from another technical evidence submission in yet another case before 
the Ombudsman). Whilst intended as a process seeking to set a single „reasonable‟ 
test standard, this extensive analysis actually emphasised the arbitrary (and 
contestable) nature of any particular test standard. Indeed, even the expert who had 
recommended the 35kg standard had regarded it as a compromise, as "It [was] less 
than someone clutching at a memorial to raise him / herself up would exert" (LGO 
2006:47) – and therefore did not actually simulate the main cause of memorial 
related injuries, and was considerably less than the 50kg test standard required for 
use in Germany.  
Whilst 35kg was seen by its proponents (including ICCM) as a modest (and 
compromise) force test standard, there is evidence of local authorities subsequently 
rationalising a lower force test level, mindful of the sensitive (and budgetary) context 
in which memorial safety sits. For example, four West Midlands authorities 
collaborated to produce a joint Memorial Management Policy (Walsall Council 2007) 
to remove inconsistencies in their approaches to memorial safety. The motivation 
appears to have been defensive, a desire to construct a „safety in numbers‟ policy 
position on the issue across their sub-region. The key feature of the joint policy was 
to justify why those authorities would not be adopting a 35kg test standard. The 
technical appendix justifying this departure from the orthodoxy of the 35kg standard 
was worded very carefully. The policy adopted a lesser, 25kg test standard (although 
this also appeared a compromise – the document indicates that the authorities‟ 
working party had actually favoured a 20kg standard).  
The policy document rationalised its deviation from ICCM guidance thus: 
"Although the [ICCM] guidance provides a clearly defined structure to 
memorial safety, the four local authorities feel that in the light of experience to 
date the successful application has been patchy, and at the current time, to 
follow it rigidly, would be disproportionate to the risk. This also follows on from 
the fact that many authorities attempting to follow the guidance are finding 
certain aspects unmanageable and in some instances inspection programmes 
have been suspended. We find this situation unacceptable." (Walsall Council 
2007: 17) 
The authors appeared to favour an approach whereby best practice would emerge 
as a distillation of actual practice - rather than the imposition of theory, in stating that 
they would: 
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"maintain contact on a regular basis with what is happening elsewhere and 
share our experiences so that a best practice will emerge from the distillation 
of what is going on throughout the burial industry." (Walsall Council 2007: 17) 
This policy was a soberly argued defence of pragmatism. In particular it challenged 
the evidence basis of the 35kg standard, and pointed to the necessity of prioritising 
the truly unstable memorial (i.e. those that would be likely to fail even a 25kg force 
test) and the resource implications of applying a more severe test standard, given 
the relatively low rate of accidents involving memorials. 
This pragmatism was further underscored in January 2009 with publication of the 
Ministry of Justice‟s guidance Managing the Safety of Burial Ground Memorials 
(Ministry of Justice 2009). The Ministry‟s guidance declared that staking should be a 
last resort, and that laying down gravestones was frowned upon. It also sought to 
question the suitability of topple testing devices and the ICCM‟s advocacy of a 35kg 
test standard. 
The guidance emphasised that the enforcing authorities should considered memorial 
safety to be an “extremely low risk” issue (Ministry of Justice 2009a: 3), and it 
introduced a new statistic into the debate in support of this: that over last 30 years 
only eight people were killed by memorials falling on them in UK10.  
The guidance also sought to reassure operators that the liability risk was low 
declaring that: 
 "there is no requirement to remove all risk. A criminal law prosecution will not 
automatically follow just because an injury or death has occurred." (Ministry of 
Justice 2009b) 
Above all the Ministry guidance sought to advocate and support local decision 
taking, by emphasising the importance of basing decisions upon local knowledge of 
memorial design/construction, and the historic importance and visitation patterns of 
the cemetery in question.  
The Ministry sought to present the guidance as representing a consensus across the 
burial services organisations – as each had been represented upon the 
Government‟s Burials and Cemeteries Advisory Group which had drawn up the 
guidance. However, whilst (like LGO 2006, and HSE 2007b) the Ministry‟s intended 
aim in issuing its guidance had been to end uncertainty (and over-reaction) on the 
memorial safety issue, early signs were that it might not achieve that end. Within 
days of its publication the ICCM (2009) issued a newsletter in response stating that it 
had received calls from members concerned that the Ministry's guidance would leave 
them exposed to liability under both the Occupiers' Liability Acts and the Health & 
Safety at Work Act 1974.  
                                                          
10 To attempt to put this risk into context, in one year (2008) 2,538 persons were killed in road 
accidents in Great Britain (DFT 2009)  
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The ICCM was concerned (as they were in response to LGO 2006) that the 
Ministry's stated preference for visual inspection and hand-only testing, signage and 
cordoning would fetter the very site level judgments that the Ministry appeared 
otherwise to be recommending. The ICCM indicated that they were not minded to 
change their own (conflicting) guidance. Therefore its members (cemetery 
managers) were left with incompatible guidance documents.  
Furthermore, there were signs that despite the issue of the Ministry‟s guidance some 
local authorities were still seeking internal approval to continue inspection and 
remedial programmes that were closer in approach to ICCM's guidance rather than 
the Ministry's view of what was "reasonable" safety provision. Such approaches (e.g. 
NBBC 2009) appeared motivated by a belief that despite the Ministry‟s guidance 
there was a risk of maladministration or civil or criminal liability if the now-conflicting 
„good practice‟ set down by ICCM 2007 and LGO 2006 guidance was not still 
followed (i.e. a 35kg force test). There was also a concern, echoing the ICCM‟s view, 
that the Ministry‟s guidance actually fettered site level risk management by its 
attempts to steer cemetery managers away from staking or laying down unsafe 
memorials. 
Time will tell whether the Ministry's guidance proves to be the final word on the 
interpretation of „reasonable‟ memorial safety. However it is clear that there are 
continuing tensions between the sensitivities (and costs) of cemetery management, 
the perception and reality of the risk of injury from unstable memorials and anxiety 
amongst cemetery managers about potential liability if an accident were to occur.  
4. How cemetery managers made sense of the issue 
A cemetery manager interviewed in Spring 2008, contemplating the then forthcoming 
Ministerial advice, expressed the feeling of confusion and flux that has been a 
feature of this issue over the last decade:  
"…what the guidelines will be this time round I don't know. The goalposts 
keep changing." 
The interviewees expressed the view that Governmental or HSE guidance at an 
earlier stage would have been helpful and it appears that the ICCM guidance may 
have achieved an „embedded‟ status amongst some managers in that (perceived) 
policy vacuum. Indeed, the ICCM's guidance, training workshops and conferences 
were cited as key sources of information, particularly within the context of peer to 
peer exchange of good practice.  
This points to the formative role of the managers' professional association, and peer 
networks as important to the formation of a sense of what is (or is not) reasonable 
memorial safety practice, and how accident and liability risks should be perceived. 
This appears to anecdotally support Bennett & Crowe's thesis (2008) that interpretive 
communities (Fish 1980) have an important role to play in guiding liability risk 
perception, although in relation to memorial safety interpretive communities appear 
to act to encourage - rather than to discourage - risk aversion.  
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A sense of pessimistic fatalism was evident amongst the interviewees, managers 
were proud of their cemeteries and, in most cases, positive about attracting people 
into cemeteries. However the ability to actually control the behaviour of visitors was 
seen as limited (despite the „policing‟ powers available to them under Article 18 of 
the Order). In particular it was noted by a number of respondents that the fatalities 
attributable to unstable memorials have tended to arise from children playing in 
cemeteries, yet in the event of an accident it would be taboo to point out that the 
injured person was a trespasser or otherwise using the cemetery in a way that was 
not permitted.  
The interview respondents all shared a fatalistic view, that their situation was a no-
win one, and that their local authorities were, in the eyes and expectations of the 
media “damned if they do and damned if they do not”. Most of the respondents 
agreed that fear of litigation and fear of adverse media coverage, were key drivers 
for memorial safety, with a belief that people are now more likely to claim for 
accidents. Most of the interviewees expressed concern about their own personal 
liability should an accident occur in „their‟ cemetery.  
All respondents agreed that memorial safety involves a delicate balancing act. For 
many respondents the process involves ongoing review and refinement, and 
listening out for warnings or innovations from peers. For many it was also a 
challenge that could never be solved to everyone's satisfaction, for despite these 
strategies, the interviewees still felt somewhat exposed, because of the inherent 
uncertainty of the law in this area as, in the words of one interviewee: 
 
"The problem with "reasonably" is that it is in the eye of the beholder, it's all 
subjective." 
The respondents acknowledged that their attempts to address memorial safety after 
the Harrogate fatality involved a steep learning curve. The interviewees were asked 
whether they considered laying down to have been a "knee jerk reaction". There was 
a mixed response to this. But many of the respondents felt that it had been a fair 
initial response to the situation local authorities felt they were facing after the 
Harrogate incident. Over time a more risk appraised and systematic approach had 
emerged - one based upon improved inspection and memorial ownership record 
keeping, greater supervision of monumental masons within their cemeteries (often 
involving registration schemes) and a more sophisticated approach to 
communication with the bereaved, for example on memorial hazard notices: 
"…we [now] don't say dangerous, we say to contact us because it‟s unstable, 
again you see - it‟s the wording." 
5. Conclusions 
The issue of memorial safety illustrates the tensions that can arise between safety 
and conflicting drivers, in this case sensitivity to the bereaved.  
In particular it suggests that circumstances can exist in which a „ratchet‟ effect will be 
resisted. The case study does, however, show evidence of „risk entrepreneurs‟ (for 
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example „topple testing‟ consultancies11 and the stance of professional bodies like 
the ICCM and NAMM) – however their ability to (consciously or unconsciously) drive 
through ever-tightening standards was, at least partially, disrupted in this case by the 
„resisting-forces‟ of the bereaved. 
This case study also shows how guidance emerged from various quarters: but with 
variable degrees of uptake by its target audience - and that the simple promulgation 
of „official‟ guidance will not automatically lead to it being accepted by all as „good 
practice‟. As Ball (2002), Haythornthwaite (quoted in RRAC 2008) and RRAC (2009) 
argue - guidance on safety and risk management is often put forward by vested 
interests, it represents a viewpoint. Depending on how it is written, and whether it 
chimes well with its intended audience it will either gain traction or fall by the 
wayside. Later, in a more "mature" phase, guidance may be evolved more 
consensually - drawing together a number of interest groups, who then attempt to 
distil available guidance into a more workable product, having regard to the fate of 
earlier attempts at putting forward guidance for the problem under examination. 
Whether the Ministry of Justice 2009 guidance will come to be eventually adopted by 
all as a final consensus position remains to be seen, but initial signs were not 
promising.  
The interviews show how individual managers have sought to make sense of, and 
render workable, the memorial safety issue by drawing upon, and at times ignoring 
or adapting, available guidance along the way. However, a pragmatic fatalism, and a 
residual fear of liability (and whether criminal, civil or a ruling of maladministration) 
continue, to a degree, to haunt these managers, alongside a heightened 
appreciation of the power of local compliant and adverse media scrutiny. Above all a 
lingering distrust of official „reassurance‟ about the low level of liability risk appears to 
remain, as encapsulated by one interviewee: 
"we've got to recognise, irrespective of whether the HSE are now saying you 
know „there's a fair degree of risk that's tolerable‟ the reality is it doesn't 
materialise like that and I certainly won't accept that until I see evidence of 
that through the courts." 
Another noted that the absence of any case law on precisely how the local 
authority's duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Acts should be interpreted in 
relation to a cemetery adds to this air of uncertainty (and potential for over-cautious 
reaction). 
Memorial safety in cemeteries clearly represents an atypical place management 
scenario. The „resisting-forces‟ of the bereaved in this case study are rather novel 
and unusually strong. Therefore no extrapolation is proposed here from this case 
                                                          
11
 For example, TCC Memorial Safety Consultants (www.columbarium.co.uk), who advertises their consultancy 
services within a ‘home’ page that presents a sequence of 2002 and 2003 press reports emphasising the 
compensation and adverse public relations consequences that could follow if a programme of testing and 
laying down is not supported by specialist knowledge in memorial safety. 
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study‟s findings, and research into other place management scenarios must continue 
to map (or refute) these alleged ratchet and risk-entrepreneur effects in other types 
of place management. The corresponding author‟s work in this area is ongoing 
(Bennett and Crowe 2008; Bennett 2009). 
------------------------------------- 
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